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Note: Products Liability in Commercial Transactions
The doctrine of products liability was developed primarily
as a means by which consumers could be compensated for per-
sonal injury and property damage caused by defective products.,
An aggrieved consumer can seek recovery from any seller in the
chain of distribution, even absent privity. According to the
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, so long as there is physical dam-
age2 caused by defective products, the seller is liable regardless
of any attempt to disclaim liability or the exercise of all possible
care in the preparation and sale of the product.
3
1. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-23 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Prosser, Assault]. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motor Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
2. While the distinction between physical damage (personal injury
and property damage) and non-physical damage (economic loss) is
usually clear, the concepts may overlap in certain situations. See, e.g.,
Air Products and Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193,
206 N.W.2d 414 (1973); Note, Economic Loss it Products Liability Juris-
prudence, 66 COLum. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966).
3. Most courts that have adopted the doctrine of products liability
follow the codification in section 402A of the RESTATEMENT:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa-
ration and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Comment (in) to section 402A is particularly significant:
m. "Warranty." The liability stated in this Section does
not rest upon negligence. It is strict liability .... The basis
of liability is purely one of tort.
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the lia-
bility, have resorted to a "warranty," either running with the
goods sold, by analogy to covenants running with the land, or
made directly to the consumer without contract. In some in-
stances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one. Al-
though warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability, and
it is generally agreed that a tort action will still lie for its
breach, it has become so identified in practice with a contract
of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant that the warranty
theory has become something of an obstacle to the recognition
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A notable expansion of the doctrine has been attempted in
a number of recent cases by commercial buyers4 who have
asserted products liability claims against sellers with whom they
were in privity in conjunction with the usual claim that a defec-
tive product constituted a breach of warranty or that it was the
result of negligent manufacture.5 Unlike most consumers,
commercial buyers can adequately assess the risks of poten-
tially defective products and bargain for contractual remedies.6
Moreover, commercial buyers are generally in as good a position
as commercial sellers to spread the losses caused by defective
of the strict liability where there is no such contract. There is
nothing in this Section which would prevent any court from
treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user
or consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and
understood that the "warranty" is a very different kind of war-
ranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that
it is not subject to the various contract rules which have grown
up to surround such sales.
The rule stated in this Section does not require any reliance
on the part of the consumer upon the reputation, skill, or judg-
ment of the seller who is to be held liable, nor any representa-
tion or undertaking on the part of that seller. The seller is
strictly liable although, as is frequently the case, the consumer
does not even know who he is at the time of consumption. The
rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of
the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial
Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by limitations on
the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer"
and "seller" in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required to
give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time
after it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act. The con-
sumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract with the person from whom he acquires the product,
and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement,
whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or
attached to and accompanying the product into the consumer's
hands. In short, "warranty" must be given a new and different
meaning if it is used in connection with this Section. It is much
simpler to regard the liability here stated as merely one of strict
liability in tort.
Id., Comment (in). Not all courts, however, have followed comment
(in) of 402A. See text accompanying notes 79-106 infra.
4. For the purpose of this Note, "commercial buyer" will denote
a purchaser that is a business association or commercial entity. "Con-
sumer" will denote all non-commercial buyers.
5. See, e.g., Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499
F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Ass'n v. French
Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Monsanto v. Alden
Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (1974); Avenell v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974). A prod-
ucts liability action is most useful when the buyer is unsure of prevailing
in negligence or on the warranty claim.
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 655-56 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER, HANDBOOK]; Speidel, Products Lia-
bility, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309, 317 (1973).
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products by raising prices to their own customers.7 Hence, the
question arises whether commercial buyers in fact need the
extensive protection products liability affords.
At present there are two dominant theories of products lia-
bility. Courts that have followed section 402A of the RESTATE-
mENT (SEcoNm) OF TORTs have focused on the type of harm
caused by the defective product, granting recovery for personal
injury and property damage but denying recovery for purely eco-
nomic losses." With only occasional lapses,9 these courts have
not allowed the commercial nature of the buyer to influence their
decisions.1 0 Courts that have rejected the type-of-harm ap-
proach have granted recovery for any type of damage caused
by defective products; however, some of these courts have per-
mitted disclaimers of products liability to be effective in certain
situations." Those courts that admit the possibility of dis-
claiming products liability have been more likely to uphold such
disclaimers against commercial buyers than consumers because
it is difficult for a commercial buyer to establish that he did not
understand a disclaimer or that the disclaimer was unconscion-
able.' 2
This Note will first describe the two basic remedies available
to all purchasers of defective products. It will then examine the
application of the two dominant theories of products liability in
cases where commercial buyers have sought to recover for
damages caused by defective products. Finally, the Note will
recommend an approach to products liability that can best
7. See Prosser, Assault, supra note 1, at 1120.
8. See text accompanying notes 32-47 and 53-88 infra.
9. See Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d
146 (3d Cir. 1974); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d
709 (10th Cir. 1974).
10. See, e.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d
781 (5th Cir. 1973); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Ass'n v. French Oil
Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
11. See text accompanying notes 89-106 infra. These courts have
not required a specific disclaimer of products liability. Rather, they
have recognized warranty disclaimers as effective disclaimers of products
liability upon a showing that the parties so intended.
12. See Monsanto v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d
90 (1974); Moreira Constr. Co., Inc. v. Moretrench Corp., 97 N.J. Super.
391, 235 A.2d 211 (1967), affd 51 N.J. 405, 241 A.2d 236 (1968). Commer-
cial entities also have difficulty proving the unconscionability of other
contractual clauses. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UCC 114-15 & n.11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHIER &
SUMMERS]. See, e.g., In re Elkins Dell Mfg. Co., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 864
(E.D. Pa. 1966); Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89
Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (1973).
19761 1063
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
accommodate the needs of consumers and commercial buyers
alike.
I. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
A. SALES LAW
With some limited exceptions, the sales remedies of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) afford the buyer as much (or
as little) protection as the parties' 3 agree to allow.14 Gener-
ally, if the seller breaches a warranty, the buyer can recover
all the standard contract damages, including consequential dam-
ages.15 And, while the UCC tends to resolve any ambiguous
or potentially misleading contractual provisions in favor of a
buyer,16 under section 2-316 sellers may nevertheless exclude
all warranties. 17 Short of excluding all warranties, sellers may,
under section 2-719, contractually exclude all consequential dam-
ages unless the exclusion would be unconscionable.
Thus, the parties may agree to both the terms of a warranty
and the remedies for breach. But not all such agreements will
be enforced. Section 2- 3021s affords protection for both parties
against overreaching by the other, permitting a court to refuse
enforcement of an unconscionable clause or entire contract.'9
13. That the parties must be in privity for one or the other to assert
a claim is a basic requirement of general contract law. With the excep-
tion of section 2-318, the UCC does not deal with privity requirements.
See WnTE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 6.
14. Id.
15. See A. CoRBIN, CoRBIN oN CONTRACTS §§ 997, 998, 1006 et seq.,
1101 (1964).
16. Under section 2-314 warranty of merchantability is implied by
operation of law unless it has been conspicuously excluded or modified.
Under 2-316 the most favorable of inconsistent warranties will be given
effect.
17. Of course, if a seller has previously given an express warranty
under section 2-313, that warranty cannot later be excluded under section
2-316.
18. (1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract,
or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the un-
conscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court
in making the determination.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
19. Section 2-719(3), quoted in note 103 infra, providing that limi-
tation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
1064 [Vol. 60:1061
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While neither the official comments to the section nor the cases
in which it has been interpreted contain a precise definition of
unconscionability,2 0 the comments state that a clause or con-
tract must be "so one-sided as to be unconscionable," and that
"[t] he principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power."'2 1  Significantly, in the cases de-
cided under 2-302 most parties asserting unconscionability have
been consumers, many of them with low incomes. 22 The
overall policy of the UCC, then, is to provide for freedom of con-
tract with exceptions to guard against misleading statements,
surprise, and oppression.
23
B. NEGLIGENCE
Manufacturers are under a duty to all foreseeably affected
parties to use due care to sell products that will not cause physi-
cal2 4 harm.2r The requirement that a buyer had to be in
privity with the manufacturer before he could sue the manufac-
turer for negligence was first abolished in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 26 so that now a buyer may sue anyone in the chain
of distribution whose negligence caused damage to his person or
property. But where the business from which the aggrieved
buyer seeks compensation is not the manufacturer, negligence
claims have remained difficult to prove and thus a less favored
remedy than claims for breach of warranty.27 Moreover, some
courts have allowed recovery in negligence actions only for
physical damage, denying relief for purely economic loss. 28
A seller may, of course, attempt to contractually exculpate
himself from negligence liability. Not only is such an approach
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, is a specific manifestation
of the policy expressed in section 2-302.
20. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 116-17.
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
22. Commercial entities have had occasional success, especially
when asserting the unconscionability of warranty disclaimers and rem-
edy limitations. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 114-15 & n.11.
23. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 6; UCC §§ 2-302, 2-314,
& 2-316.
24. See note 2 supra.
25. PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 643.
26. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
27. See G. PETERS, PRODUCTS LiABmTY AND SAFETY 3-4 (1971); Pros-
ser, Assault, supra note 1, at 1116-18.
28. See Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1972). See also Note, supra note 2, at 929.
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fraught with practical difficulties-the disclaimer would have to
somehow extend beyond the buyer with whom the seller is in
privity-but under all circumstances the disclaimer would have
to withstand stringent judicial scrutiny when asserted as a
defense to a negligence action.29 At the very least, an excul-
patory clause must be so explicit that it is clearly comprehen-
sible to a buyer.3 0 Beyond that, courts have invalidated dis-
claimers where the respective bargaining power of the parties
was grossly disparate, holding that such clauses were void as
against public policy.
31
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
A. BACKGROUND
Products liability doctrine developed as a response to the
inadequacy of sales law and negligence law as remedies for con-
sumers attempting to recover for damages caused by defective
products.3 2  Now, according to section 402A of the RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND), which many courts accept as a statement of the
doctrine, a person who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or to his property is liable for
any resulting physical harm, regardless of lack of privity, lack of
negligent conduct by the seller, or any contractual disclaimers of
29. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Poorvu v. United States, 420 F.2d
993 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
30. Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 812 (1960); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc.,
21 Conn. Sup. 38, 143 A.2d 466 (1958).
31. Precisionware, Inc. v. Madison County Tobacco Warehouse, Inc.,
411 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1969); Hardware Mutual Ins. Co. of Minn. v. C.A.
Snyder, Inc., 242 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1957). Commercial buyers, however,
have rarely prevailed with public policy arguments. See Delta Air Lines
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974); Mayfair Fab-
rics v. Henley, 48 N.J. 483, 226 A.2d 602 (1967); Jackson v. First Nat'l
Bank of Lake Forest, 415 IlL 453, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953).
32. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text. As it developed,
the doctrine was labeled at successive stages as implied warranty and
strict liability in tort. One reason the warranty terminology was aban-
doned was confusion with the UCC version of implied warranty. See
Prosser, Assault, supra note 1, at 1124-34; UCC §§ 2-314 through 2-318.
This Note uses the phrase "products liability" rather than "strict liability
in tort" because the latter term also has an historical antecedent with
which it might be confused. See PROSSMn, HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at §§
75-81. Also, the words "strict" and "tort" may in themselves suggest out-
comes that may not necessarily be consistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the doctrine.
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liability. Some of the most important purposes underlying the
doctrine are peculiar to the interests of noncommercial consum-
ers, including compensation of the injured, who often are unable
to recover under a warranty or negligence theory;33 provision
by the seller of a form of social insurance by spreading its losses
among all its buyers; 34 and protection of consumers who,
through ignorance, lack of bargaining power, or lack of choice,
could not protect themselves by obtaining contractual reme-
dies. -3  Other purposes are of a more general nature, such as
encouraging safety by deterring sellers from placing defective
products on the market3 6 and avoiding multiple litigation
caused by the sale of defective products through chains of
distributors.3
7
Although products liability doctrine focused initially on
personal injuries caused by defective products,38 it was soon
applied to property damage as well.3 9 And while some courts
(and the RESTATEMENT) 4 0 have retained the requirement of
physical damage of some sort as a prerequisite to a products lia-
bility action,41 other courts have extended recovery to purely eco-
33. Prosser, Assault, supra note 1, at 1120. See Seely v. White Motor
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
34. Id.
35. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962). This reason might also apply
to some commercial buyers. See text accompanying note 94 infra.
36. Prosser, Assault, supra note 1, at 1119. Even Prosser, however,
does not place much reliance on the effectiveness of this deterrent. The
desire of a seller to maintain a good business reputation is probably a
stronger deterrent than products liability. See generally I. GRAY, PROD-
UCTS LABami r 151-57 (1975). Also, because some percentage of all prod-
ucts sold will unavoidably be defective, completely effective deterrence
could never result. See id. at 8-10, 151; G. PETERS, PRODUCTS LAa BIrrY
AND SAFETY 3-4 (1971).
37. Multiple litigation is avoided because privity is not required in
products liability actions, and thus sub-purchasers can sue manufacturers
directly. Also, because of the availability of a direct action, the risk of
bankruptcy of the intermediate seller is placed on those sellers further
back in the chain instead of on the ultimate buyer. See PRossER, HAND-
BOOK, supra note 6, at 651.
38. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor Co.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Of course, when these cases were de-
cided the doctrine was not yet called products liability. See note 32
supra.
39. One court has recently held, however, that products liability is
available only when a defect causes personal injury. Hawkins Constr.
Co. v. Matthew Co., Inc., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
40. See note 3 supra.
41. See text accompanying notes 43-47 and 64-78 infra. Even
among courts for which physical damage has been a prerequisite to re-
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nomic losses.42
In Seely v. White Motor Co.,43 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia approved a distinction based on the type of harm caused
by the defective product, emphasizing the difference between
concerns for safety and for product quality unrelated to safety.
According to the court, only the former concerns were properly
dealt with under products liability doctrine; the latter concerns
were adequately covered by the UCC. It also suggested that the
duty to avoid physical harm was absolute, stating that "[t]his
liability could not be disclaimed, for one purpose of strict liability
in tort is to prevent a manufacturer from defining the scope of
responsibility for harm caused by his products. '' 44 The opinion
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,45 a California case in
which the products liability cause of action was established in
that state, and which was cited throughout Seely, was based on
the assumption of a one-sided seller-buyer relationship:
The purpose [of such liability] is . . . to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves.40
Consistent with the Greenman position, the Seely court main-
tained that "[a] consumer should not be charged at the will of
the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when
he buys a product on the market."47 Its view of products liabil-
ity theory thus appeared to be based on an across-the-board
assumption of gross disparities in bargaining power between
sellers and buyers.
In contrast to the courts that have conditioned recovery on
the type of harm caused by the defective product, there are
courts that have sustained products liability actions where the
defective product did not actually cause physical damage. For
these courts, the definition of a defective product has been the
covery, it is uncertain whether non-physical losses caused by the same
defect are recoverable. Compare Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d
1015 (8th Cir. 1974) with Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502(1965).
42. See text accompanying notes 48-51 and 89-106 infra.
43. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
44. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
45. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
46. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (1962).
47. 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (1965) (em-
phasis added).
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same as the definition of an unmerchantable product under the
UCC.48 In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,4 9 for example,
a carpet developed an aesthetically displeasing defect, but one
that caused no personal injuries or property damage. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed the plaintiff to recover
the loss of his bargain, namely the difference between the price
he paid and the actual market value of the carpet. In so decid-
ing, the court emphasized two factors: the generally unequal
bargaining position between manufacturers and consumers, and
reliance of consumers on manufacturer representations made by
simply placing the product on the market. Observed the court:
[The] doctrine [of products liability] stems from the reality of
the relationship between the manufacturers of products and the
consuming public to whom the products are offered for sale.
As we indicated in Henningsen, the great mass of the purchas-
ing public has neither adequate knowledge nor sufficient oppor-
tunity to determine if articles bought or used are defective.
Obviously they must rely on the skill, care and reputation of
the seller.50
Although the Santor court framed its theory in terms of the
reliance of a buyer on a seller's implicit representations, the
result of the case was to impose on sellers a duty to avoid dis-
tributing defective products that would result in harm to subse-
quent buyers. 51 Notably, however, courts following the Santor
approach in not insisting on actual physical damage as a pre-
requisite to a products liability action have been less certain than
the Seely court that products liability is not disclaimable. 52
48. Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average qualit -
within the description; and(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
UCC § 2-314 (2).
49. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
50. Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
51. See Note, supra note 2, at 937-38. Because the sales contract in
Santor included no disclaimer, the court did not have to resolve whether
a products liability disclaimer was enforceable.
52. See text accompanying notes 89-106 infra.
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B. TYPE-OF-HARM APPROACH IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Under the type-of-harm approach to products liability, the
commercial nature of the buyer usually has not affected the
court's decision. 53  Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT, heavily
relied on by the type-of-harm courts, conditions recovery on a
number of factors: the product must be defective; it must be
unreasonably dangerous; it must cause damage to person or prop-
erty; it must be expected to reach the buyer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold and actually do so;
and it must be sold by a person engaged in the business of
selling the particular product.54
1. Recovery for physical damage
Where a commercial buyer seeks recovery for damage to its
property, the type-of-harm approach to products liability will
support a cause of action.55 , In Air Products and Chemicals,
Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.56 large electric motors used to
drive compressors failed to function properly, and the buyer
sought to recover repair and alteration costs and lost profits.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided that if the buyer's alle-
gations that the motors were physically damaged as a result of
defective components were sustained, the trial court must then
conclude that the motors were "unreasonably dangerous" to the
plaintiff's property and that the buyer had stated a valid cause
of action under section 402A. 58 The court rejected the defend-
ant's contentions that in this commercial context the damage to
the motors was actually an economic loss and that therefore a
products liability action would not lie.
53. See, e.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp., Inc. v. RCA Corp., 481
F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio
App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974); Air Products and Chem., Inc., v. Fair-
banks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973). But see Delta
Air Lines, Inc., v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974);
Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.
1974); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.
1974).
54. See note 3 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
56. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
57. Since the appeal was from an order sustaining the defendant's
claim that the facts alleged did not constitute a cause of action in pro-
ucts liability, the court did not specifically decide whether the lost profits
were recoverable under products liability. It merely decided that the
damages alleged were sufficient to state a cause of action. See also note
60 infra and accompanying text.
58. See note 3 and text accompanying note 54 supra.
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In Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc.59 the pur-
chaser of a rebuilt aircraft engine sought recovery for damages
to his airplane that crashed when the engine failed on take-
off. There were no personal injuries. The warranty for repairs
during the first six months or 100 hours of operation was inef-
fective, since the crash occurred more than one year and 583
operating hours after the sale.60 The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals betrayed its concern over the commercial nature of
the buyer by holding that the term "consumer" as used in sec-
tion 402A 61 served as a substantive condition to a cause of action
for products liability. It concluded, however, that the term could
be interpreted to include the plaintiff, a corporate entity that
had negotiated the contract with the defendant. In setting forth
its broad definition of "consumer," the court stated that
although plaintiff may be considered an expert in the field of
aviation generally, there is no evidence to establish plaintiff's
specific expertise in the manufacture of airplaine engines or to
preclude it from being classified as a consumer in the purchase
of the engine in question.62
While upholding the plaintiff's claim in this particular case, the
court left open the possibility that some types of buyers would
not be entitled to bring an action for products liability.63
Yet another court sought to clarify the significance of the
nature of the buyer in products liability cases in Boone Valley
Cooperative Processing Association v. French Oil Mill Machinery
59. 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974).
60. The court stated that the exclusion of all other warranties did
not appear to abrogate the plaintiff's cause of action for products liabil-
ity, since the exclusion did not specifically mention any waiver of strict
liability. 499 F.2d at 712. The court did not expressly decide whether
a specific disclaimer of strict liability would have been effective. See
McNichols, Who Says that Strict Tort Disclaimers Can Never be Effec-
tive? The Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OxiA. L. REV. 494, 520-23 (1975);
note 88 infra.
61. The court indicated that the evidence concerning the status of
the buyer as a consumer under section 402A would be heard and the
issue decided on remand. It is not clear if the court was referring to
the words "consumer or user" in the main body of 402A, or to the word
"consumer" in comment (m) to 402A, which states that the cause of ac-
tion is not affected by any disclaimer.
62. 499 F.2d at 713 (10th Cir. 1974).
63. In grounding its decision on the buyer's expertise, the court re-
lied on a rationale similar to that emphasized by the courts that have
upheld products liability disclaimers. See text accompanying notes 87
& 104 infra,
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Co.64 But in doing so, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa appeared to disapprove the position
taken earlier by the court for the southern district of Iowa. In
Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co.,65 the earlier southern district case, the plaintiff
sought to recover profits lost due to the breakdown of a trans-
former. The sales contract had excluded liability for conse-
quential damages. Denying recovery, the court said:
The loss plaintiff is seeking to recover is a commercial loss. The
plaintiff is a large corporation, fully cognizant of commercial
law. The doctrine of strict liability in tort, designed to aid the
consumer in an unequal bargaining position who is physically
injured, loses all meaning when a large public utility or other
large company is the plaintiff and is suing solely for commercial
loss.6 6
Apparently the court believed that both the nature of the
damage and the nature of the buyer were important to its deci-
sion.6 7 But the court demonstrated lingering uncertainty over
the relative weight of the two factors by specifically refusing
to opine whether a consumer with little bargaining power would
be allowed to recover purely economic loss in a products liability
action.
In Boone Valley, however, the court for the northern dis-
trict held that a products liability action would lie with a
commercial buyer. In that case, a machine used to process soy-
beans had exploded, damaging the plaintiff's plant and causing
it to be closed down temporarily. Here, too, the seller had ex-
cluded liability for consequential damages in the contract. The
court rejected the suggestion in Iowa Light that the availability
of products liability actions should be conditioned on the unequal
bargaining positions of the parties to a contract. More critically,
it doubted whether such an inquiry could legitimately be made,
stating that "[t] his Court fails to see how a line could be drawn
based on a party's size which would control that party's ability
to assert a theory of recovery."6 8
The Boone Valley court went on, however, to reveal some
concern for limiting liability for economic losses in a products
64. 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
65. 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
66. Id. at 32.
67. Another court has interpreted Iowa Light as standing for the
proposition that products liability doctrine may not be invoked in any
case where the parties are in equal bargaining positions. States Steam-
ship Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500, 507 (D.N.J.
1973).
68. 383 F. Supp. at 614 n.6 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
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liability case. It declared that profits that were lost because of
the explosion might be recoverable, but that profits lost without
accompanying physical damage would not be.6 And while addi-
tional recovery for economic loss is not altogether unknown
under the type-of-harm approach, 70 the court nevertheless tried
to limit the amount of the award by calculating lost profits not
by a tort measure, but by a more restrictive contract measure.71
It required not only that the lost profits be proximately caused
by the original physical damage, but also that the parties be in
privity and that the loss of profits have been foreseeable. 72
This result is consistent with the focus of the type-of-harm courts
on physical damage as the gravamen of the products liability
action.73 It is understandable that the no-fault nature of prod-
ucts liability may foster a judicial reluctance to adopt the analogy
to economic loss recovery under a pure negligence theory.
2. Recovery for purely economic loss
Economic loss, absent accompanying physical damage, has
not been a basis for a cause of action under the type-of-harm
approach reflected in section 402A of the RESTATEMENT. In
Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp.74 a television station
69. Id. at 614-15. A state court has expressed uncertainty as to the
appropriateness of recovery of lost profits in a products liability case.
In Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d
800 (1970), the owners of a golf course sought recovery from a remote
seller for losses incurred as a result of defective golf carts, including bar-
gain losses, repair costs, and lost profits. The court followed the reason-
ing of Santor, refusing to require physical damage in order to sustain
a products liability action. While the court granted recovery of the bar-
gain losses and repair costs, it remanded the question of lost profits for
a new trial. If the lost profits were proven, the court said, then it would
decide whether it should limit this recovery in any way.
In Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324
N.E.2d 583 (1974), however, a type-of-harm court indicated in dictum
that once liability was established, any damage resulting from the defect
should be recoverable. Id. at 159 n.8, 324 N.E.2d at 589 n.8.
70. Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1974).
71. 383 F. Supp. at 615 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
72. Id.
73. Note that some courts have traditionally allowed recovery of
economic losses in negligence actions on the theory that once the duty
to use due care has been breached, the wrongdoer should be held liable
for all the harm caused by his negligence. For a decision that employed
this theory to allow recovery of lost profits in a products liability action,
see Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir, 1974).
74. 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
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sought to recover losses that it had incurred as a result of a defec-
tive transmitter. The station allegedly had lost advertising
revenue due to both the delay of its initial broadcasting date
and later interruptions of service. RCA had excluded all liability
for consequential damages in the sales contract. The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, without mentioning the commercial
context of the transaction, held simply that since the defective
product had not physically harmed Fredonia's property, a cause
of action for products liability would not lie.
Other courts denying recovery for purely economic loss have
indicated that the commercial context was important to their de-
cisions. For instance, in Southwest Forest Industries v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.75 the buyer of a turbine generator sought
to recover damages for lost time, labor, materials, and loss of
business resulting from slowdowns and shutdowns of the gen-
erator. The seller had limited the warranty in the sales con-
tract to the repair and replacement of defective parts and
had excluded consequential damages. In denying recovery, the
Ninth Circuit quoted the opinion of the district court: "The cir-
cumstances of this case do not bring the plaintiff within that
class of consumers, type of transaction, or damages suffered that
created the need for relief based on strict liability in tort.' '7 6
A similar factual situation was presented in Avenell v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.77 In that case the plaintiff sought
to recover damages resulting from a defective turbine generator,
including both lost revenues and the additional costs of obtaining
alternate sources of power. The seller had given a warranty only
for repair and replacement of defective parts and had excluded
consequential damages. Refusing to ignore the commercial con-
text of the transaction, the Supreme .Court of Ohio denied
recovery for these purely economic losses. The court asserted
that products liability was designed to ensure that "the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products [should be] borne by
the manufacturers, rather than the injured person powerless to
protect himself."78 It emphasized that the parties were in privity
and had actually negotiated the terms of the contract, thus imply-
ing that the buyer was not "powerless" and could have bargained
for an adequate contractual remedy.
75. 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970).
76. Id. at 1020.
77. 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
78. Id. at 158, 324 N.E.2d at 589 (emphasis added).
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3. Possibility of effective disclaimers of products liability in the
type-of-harm approach
Notwithstanding the history of products liability doctrine 79
and comment (m) to section 402A of the RESTATEMENT, ° two type-
of-harm courts have held that disclaimers of products liability
may be effective in some situations.8 ' In Delta Air Lines, Inc.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.82 a contract for the sale of a com-
mercial airplane included a clause purporting to exculpate the
seller for any liability that might arise from gyration of the air-
plane. When the nose gear of the airplane collapsed, the plane
was damaged, but no one was injured. Relying on an early Cali-
fornia decision,8 3 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the products liability claim was barred by the sales contract that
exculpated the seller from negligence liability. The court ap-
peared unconcerned that the clause did not disclaim products lia-
bility specifically.
In Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp.8 4 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals also refused to absolutely dis-
allow products liability disclaimers, but it provided a more
thorough analysis for its decision than did the court in Delta.
In Keystone, the buyer of a used helicopter sought to recover
for damage to the helicopter caused by a crash-landing. No per-
sons were injured in the crash. The aircraft had been sold "as
is," and hence all warranties had been disclaimed.8 5 The con-
tract also provided that the seller "[would] be held harmless of
any liability in connection with [the] sale."8 6 The court decided
that validating disclaimers of products liability, at least in certain
79. See notes 32-37 and 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
80. See note 3 supra.
81. Note that the non-disclaimability of products liability is one of
its most powerful features, along with the absence of the privity require-
ment. Thus, to hold products liability disclaimable in some situations
is very near to holding that no products liability action is available in
those situations. See text accompanying notes 97-98 infra.
82. 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974).
83. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d
95, 47 Cal Rptr. 518 (1965). The two cases involved entirely separate
causes of action. The 1975 case arose in the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals as a diversity action. The court followed the conflict of laws rule
of Georgia, which provided that the law of the state where a contract
was made (California in this case) would govern the interpretation of
the contract unless the result would be contrary to the public policy of
Georgia. 503 F.2d at 243.
84. 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
85. See UCC § 2-316 (3) (a).
86. 499 F.2d at 148.
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limited situations, was necessary to avoid the judicial "overkill"
that would otherwise result from extending a valid legal prin-
ciple to situations where it did not properly apply. Disclaimers
would be effective, it said, when "the sale was a pure commer-
cial transaction between two knowledgeable corporations which
have consciously negotiated terms and price, and only property
damage is at issue. 8 7 Comparing the disclaimability of products
liability with the disclaimability of negligence liability generally,
the court found no reason to ban the former while permitting
the latter. It concluded, however, that the attempted disclaimer
by Keystone was not sufficiently explicit. Apparently, it sub-
jected the disclaimer of products liability to the same critical
judicial scrutiny that has traditionally been applied to disclaim-
ers of negligence liability.8 8
C. THE NEW JERSEY APPROACH TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc.8 9 broadened the scope of products liability
doctrine by allowing purely economic loss to form the basis of
a valid claim.90 In later cases, however, lower New Jersey courts
have considerably narrowed the scope of products liability where
certain kinds of plaintiffs have been involved, even when the
loss was the result of physical damage. They have indicated that
they will enforce disclaimers in some situations against buyers
who have contracted to accept them. If not unconscionable, the
agreement between the parties is to be regarded as determinative.
In Moreira Construction Co., Inc. v. Moretrench Corp.,' the
plaintiff sought recovery for damages resulting from construc-
tion delays that had been caused by malfunctioning rented
pumps.9 2 In the rental contract, the defendant had limited the
87. Id. at 148-49.
88. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra. At least two other
courts, implicitly agreeing with the reasoning in Keystone, have indi-
cated that they, too, might be willing to hold an explicit disclaimer of
products liability effective. In Arrow Transportation Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Ore. 1968), the court, holding that a warranty
disclaimer did not affect a products liability action, volunteered that it
was not reaching the issue of the effect of an explicit disclaimer of prod-
ucts liability on an action in products liability, thus leaving the question
open. Id. at 173. See also Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33
N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1973); note
60 supra.
89. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
90. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
91. 97 N.J. Super. 391, 235 A.2d 211 (1967).
92. New Jersey courts previously had allowed recovery based on
1076 [Vol. 60:1061
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
plaintiff's remedies for breach of warranty to the replacement
of defective parts, excluding recovery of consequential damages.
The court held that the limitation of damages in the contract
was effective as against a products liability claim, even though
the limitation did not expressly refer to products liability. The
court distinguished Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,93 in
which a warranty disclaimer was declared void as against public
policy, as involving a consumer in a weak bargaining position
compared to that of the sellers in the automobile industry.
Moreover, the disclaimer in Henningsen was standardized
throughout the industry, and was thus viewed as a contract of
adhesion. In Moreira the court concluded that there was "no
showing that plaintiff was precluded from negotiating a contract
on more favorable terms.'9 4
In another case involving a contractual disclaimer of liabil-
ity, Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc.,9 5 the defendant had
purchased dry organic chemicals from the plaintiff. From time
to time the chemicals had spontaneously ignited, causing exten-
sive damage to at least three buildings, including two owned by
Alden Leeds and one by a landlord of Alden Leeds. When Mon-
santo sued for the price of the goods, Alden Leeds counterclaimed
to recover for its property damage and introduced the third party
claim of its landlord. Monsanto, however, had disclaimed all
warranties and limited the buyer's remedies to recovery of the
price of the goods. In order to determine the effect of the dis-
claimer, the court faced two issues: whether the disclaimer was
intended to include products liability claims and whether the dis-
claimer was unconscionable. Although it concluded that further
testimony was necessary concerning the commercial context, pur-
pose, and effect of the contract, the court indicated that the dis-
claimer would in any event be unconscionable if it was impossible
to purchase the chemicals anywhere without having to accept
a similar type of disclaimer.
Reasoning from the decision in Santor v. A & M Karagheu-
sian, Inc., the court further decided that recovery might be had
under products liability doctrine for what it labeled "commercial
products liability for defective products that were simply leased. Cin-
trone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
93. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
94. 97 N.J. Super. 391, 395, 235 A.2d 211, 213 (1967).
95. 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (1974).
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loss."96  Although the court apparently was referring to the
type of buyer and not to the type of harm, since the loss in
Monsanto was due to physical damage caused by a fire, it was
clear that commercial buyers per se were not to be deprived of
.a cause of action in products liability. The court simply stated
that "the extent to which the strict liability in tort doctrine will
be applied to a commercial loss is up to the parties.
'97
In New Jersey, then, the effect of allowing disclaimers of
products liability where the parties are in privity appears to be
virtually the same as the result dictated by the UCC provisions
governing warranties.98 Unlike warranty theory, however, the
right of action that arises under products liability doctrine ex-
tends to nonprivity as well as privity buyers, and for the former,
a disclaimer is ineffective.9 9 In Monsanto, for instance, if further
evidence demonstrated that the disclaimer covered products lia-
bility claims and was not unconscionable, only Alden Leeds's
landlord would have a cause of action, because the disclaimer
would only bind buyers in privity with Monsanto. 10 0 Thus,
under New Jersey law,10 ' while buyers of defective products
causing only economic loss are in an unusually favorable position,
buyers in general would be well advised never to deal directly
with a manufacturer.
And while the Monsanto court viewed the disclaimer at issue
there in terms of unconscionability under the UCC, the court
-in a subsequent case seemed to apply a more stringent standard.
In Turner v. International Harvester Co. 10 2 a used truck was
sold "as is" and subsequently collapsed on the buyer, fatally
injuring him. The truck was purchased for use in the decedent's
96. Said the court: "Corporations are, in the last analysis, owned
by people who rely upon them for income, and thus commercial losses
are often reflected in personal sorrow." 130 N.J. Super. at 259, 326 A.2d
at 98.
97. Id.
98. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
99. Manufacturers can, however, attempt to require that their im-
mediate buyers also disclaim products liability when they resell the
product, enforcing the requirement with a "hold-harmless" clause.
100. If the disclaimer was unconscionable, Alden Leeds would have
had an action for products liability and on the warranty, while the land-
lord would have had an action only for products liability. The landlord
was not a privy party under UCC section 2-318.
101. Apparently only the Court of Appeals of Michigan has also al-
lowed recovery for products liability absent physical damage. Thus far
Michigan courts have not decided whether disclaimers of products liabil-
ity can ever be effective. See note 69 supra.
102. 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975).
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small business. The court decided that in order for the dis-
claimer to be effective, the buyer must have been both aware
that the "as is" disclaimer covered safety defects and as know-
ledgeable about the product and in as good a position as the seller
to guard against all the risks of the product. It probably
employed these additional criteria because personal injury was
involved,10 3 because the buyer was not clearly a commercial
entity, and because the product involved had been previously
used. 0 4
III. A RECOMMENDATION
Products liability doctrine continues to evolve under the
challenge of new factual situations. While section 402A of the
RESTATEMENT is a useful summary of many aspects of the
doctrine, it should not be treated as the final statement of its
evolution. Where such an important element of the usual prod-
ucts liability claim as the consumer status of the buyer is absent,
the law should be flexible enough to accommodate the different
considerations of each new situation. From the start, the pur-
poses underlying products liability remedies were the desire to
provide social insurance through risk-spreading by sellers and
the desire to protect buyers against their own bargaining
disadvantage. 0 r
103. See UCC § 2-719 (3):
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not.
104. While the disclaimer-approach courts have not usually em-
ployed the "unreasonably dangerous" criterion of section 402A of the RE-
STATMEINT, the court in Turner nevertheless conditioned recovery on the
unreasonably dangerous nature of the used product. Type-of-harm
courts have employed this same criterion to deny products liability
causes of action, even where physical damage is present, in used-product
cases such as Cornelius v. Bay Motors Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299
(1971). In Cornelius the court concluded that since the consumer did
not expect his used car to be free of defects, the car was not unreasonably
dangerous to him. It could nevertheless be unreasonably dangerous to
bystanders, who would still have an action for products liability. The
focus of the unreasonably dangerous inquiry thus is on the buyer's
expectations and awareness of risks. Since one focus of the disclaimer
inquiry should also be on these factors, the effect of relying on the "un-
reasonably dangerous" criterion in this manner is very similar to uphold-
ing disclaimers in some situations. See text accompanying notes 87 & 102
supra. The Turner court discussed both whether the disclaimer was
effective and whether the truck was unreasonably dangerous, but with-
out clearly distinguishing the two issues.
105. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. Disclaimers can be
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Many courts have noted that commercial buyers do not fit
neatly into the mainstream of products liability theory.10 0 For
example, courts that have denied commercial buyers recovery for
purely economic losses have often supported their decisions by
reasoning that these buyers do not need the remedies of products
liability.107 Indeed, since commercial buyers are the usual suf-
ferers of economic loss, denial by the type-of-harm courts of
recovery for purely economic losses can itself be seen as one indi-
cation of a judicial tendency to exempt commercial transactions
from products liability law.
The reasoning that commercial buyers do not need the
remedies of products liability to recover for economic loss would
apply equally well to claims involving property damage and per-
sonal injury.108 It is not necessary that "social insurance" be
effective only where the parties are in privity, so that the multiple litiga-
tion rationale does not apply.
106. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d
239 (5th Cir. 1974); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp.,
499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc.,
499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974); Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902
(1970); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324
N.E.2d 583 (1974).
107. See Southwest Forest Indus. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422
F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); Avenell v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
108. The court in Seely v. White Motor Co. noted that:
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the
economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods.
The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates
that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions
of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code, but rather,
to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.
The fact that the warranty theory was not suited to the field
of liability for personal injuries, however, does not mean that
it has no function at all. In Greenman we recognized only that
"rules defining and governing warranties that were developed
to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly
be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those in-jured by its defective products unless those rules also serve the
purposes for which such liability is imposed." (Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901.) Although the rules governing war-
ranties complicated resolution of the problems of personal in-
juries, there is no reason to conclude that they do not meet the
"needs of commercial transactions." The law of warranty "grew
as a branch of the law of commercial transactions." (See James,
Products Liability, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 192; Llewellyn, On Warranty
of Quality, and Society, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 699, 37 Colum. L. Rev.
341.
Although the rules of warranty frustrate rational compensa-
tion for physical injury, they function well in a commercial set-
ting.
63 Cal. 2d 9, 15-16, 403 P.2d 145, 149-50, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21-22.
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provided to compensate for business losses. Property damage
caused by a defective product is merely a type of business loss;
so is personal injury to the extent that a business actually pays
the claim of an employee or a third party. If courts are pre-
pared to recognize generally the utility and appropriateness of
contractual risk allocation in a commercial setting, there is no
reason to distinguish one business risk from another. Keystone
apparently accepted the effectiveness of a products disclaimer
when applied to property damage claims, at least where the sale
is between "two knowledgeable corporations,"'1 9 but, by implica-
tion, not when applied to personal injury claims. But as long
as an injured individual's right to a products liability action is
preserved, it is difficult to see why at least a large business-
a commercial buyer-should be precluded from accepting the risk
of having to pay these personal injury claims rather than the
seller-manufacturer. A disclaimer of liability for personal in-
juries would have the same effect as an agreement by a
commercial buyer to indemnify a manufacturer for payment of
personal injury claims.
Products liability doctrine interferes with freedom of con-
tract for a purpose. If the doctrine is applied to transactions
in which that purpose is not being served, however, the flexibil-
ity of private bargaining is unnecessarily sacrificed. In the case
of commercial buyers, then, who are able to effectively bargain
for a contractual remedy, comprehend the risks they are assum-
ing, and spread their losses among their own customers,110 the
courts will have to develop a different theory of products liabil-
ity before it makes sense to prevent these buyers from choosing
to bear the risk of loss from property damage and personal
injury caused by defective products."'
Restricting or eliminating products liability in commercial
transactions could be accomplished by one of two doctrinal de-
vices. First, courts could simply hold that products liability does
not run to commercial buyers. Since products liability is, after
all, an additional remedy superimposed over an already complex
scheme of remedies for defective products, the primary result of
removing the products liability remedy would be to re-establish
109. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
110. See Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d
146, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1974).
111. When courts award lost profits resulting from physical injury,
the buyer's contractual freedom is infringed even more. See note 73
supra and accompanying text.
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the effect of the UCC warranty provisions governing the sale
of goods. In the usual commercial transaction, a product which
would be "defective" under 402A would also breach the implied
warranty of merchantability. Therefore the ultimate liability for
such defects would depend on whether the contract contained
an effective disclaimer or limitation of warranty liability.
Second, courts could hold that while a products liability rem-
edy is available to all buyers, commercial buyers may waive the
remedy by agreeing to a disclaimer of products liability. To say
that products liability is disclaimable is virtually the same as
saying that it does not apply at all, but two practical differences
might be generated by the different doctrinal devices. First,
courts focusing on the concept of "disclaimer" could require a
specific kind of disclaimer for products liability-express mention
of the term "products liability" or mention of physical and per-
sonal injury. In contrast, courts removing products liability alto-
gether and treating the case as a warranty issue would presum-
ably treat the adequacy of a warranty disclaimer only under the
UCC. Second, while an effective warranty disclaimer or limita-
tion is effective against all parties in the chain of distribution,
a disclaimer of products liability might well be treated like a
disclaimer of negligence liability, binding only on the privity
buyer who agrees to it. Thus, under the disclaimer approach,
commercial buyers not in privity with the seller would not lose
their products liability claims. Therefore, where a disclaimer of
products liability is effective under the disclaimer approach, the
ultimate liability for defects would again depend on whether the
contract contained an effective disclaimer or limitation of war-
ranty liability.
Regardless of the functional similarity of the two methods,
and although disclaimability of products liability is a seeming
anomaly, courts seem to find comfort in limiting the disclaim-
ability exception to buyers who have actually agreed to a prod-
ucts liability disclaimer. They have had difficulty implementing
a commercial exception that simply denies a products liability
cause of action to a particular group of plaintiffs. The Sterner
court indicated that it would limit recovery to "consumers," but
it left little content to that concept by defining it so broadly." -
The court in Boone refused to create a theory that would condi-
tion recovery for products liability on the buyer's status as either
a consumer or a commercial entity, stating: "This Court fails
112. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
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to see how a line could be drawn based on a party's size which
would control a party's ability to assert a theory of recov-
ery."' 1 3 The Boone court appeared concerned not only by the
line-drawing problem, but also by the idea of limiting a plain-
tiff's right to invoke an established legal theory.
In contrast to this reluctance to approve a wholesale excep-
tion for commercial buyers, the New Jersey courts and two
federal appeals courts employing the type-of-harm approach
have departed from the theory of section 402A by validating dis-
claimers of products liability in commercial transactions.11 4
Because specific disclaimers of products liability have until
recently been rare or non-existent," 5 it is not surprising that
few type-of-harm courts have adjudicated their effectiveness.
Even some courts that have not faced that issue, however, have
suggested that specific disclaimers of products liability might be
upheld.1 6 It may be that these courts regard validation of
products liability disclaimers as a less drastic step than exempt-
ing an entire class of buyers from products liability protection.
Also, because of their familiarity with the use of disclaimers by
sellers, and their arsenal of devices to challenge the validity of
disclaimers, the courts are able to retain some final control over
attempts by sellers to exculpate themselves. Moreover, that a
commercial buyer has knowingly agreed to a disclaimer expressly
covering products liability may make it easier for a court to jus-
tify setting aside the new but already venerable section 402A,
whereas reliance on a general exemption would leave propo-
nents to argue on broad public policy grounds rather than on
the compelling facts of the case at hand.
Should disclaimers of products liability be held enforceable,
important questions would arise as to the form of the disclaimer
and the type of buyer who will be allowed to agree to a dis-
claimer. The type-of-harm courts have consistently held that a
warranty disclaimer is ineffective against a products liability
claim;117 at the very least, then, these courts will require a
113. 383 F. Supp. at 615 n.6. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 82-88 and 91-101 supra.
115. Type-of-harm courts have always held that warranty disclaim-
ers alone are not effective against products liability claims. See, e.g.,
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
116. See note 88 supra.
117. See note 115 supra.
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disclaimer that specifically mentions products liability.11 8 The
court in Keystone went even further and demanded that prod-
ucts liability disclaimers be clear and explicit, fulfilling the more
stringent requirements of negligence disclaimers. 119  New
Jersey courts, on the other hand, have required only that the
disclaimer be intended to include products liability claims-
products liability need not have been specifically mentioned.
1 20
In any event, the question of required form probably will not
loom large in commercial transactions, for once the form is estab-
lished, sellers will employ whatever words are necessary.
The question of which buyers will be allowed to agree to
disclaimers is more problematic. Keystone, a decision under the
type-of-harm approach, indicated that one group of buyers
against whom disclaimers clearly should be effective are large
businesses able to spread risks, to assess and comprehend the
risks of a product, and to knowingly consent to the risks.' 2' The
type-of-harm courts have already dealt with a major aspect of
the applicability of products liability doctrine to commercial
transactions by means of the exception for purely economic
losses. Since the only liability at issue is the more serious per-
sonal injury and property damage, it might be expected that the
class of buyers allowed to agree to disclaimers would be fairly
restrictive.12
2
In contrast, the New Jersey courts seem to have approached
the question of disclaimers on the assumption that the primary
purpose of products liability is to protect against the buyer's in-
ferior bargaining position and that the risk-spreading effect is
only an incidental benefit. These courts have relied primarily
on the unconscionability provisions of the UCC12S to protect buy-
ers and have allowed all conscionable disclaimers of products lia-
bility to be effective. Even in Turner, where the court did not
expressly use an unconscionability standard to judge the dis-
claimer, the inquiry into the nature of the deceased's business
related to his capacity to appreciate the risks and to understand
the contract-not to his ability to function as a risk-spreader.
Unlike 6ourts that would require risk-spreading capability of the
buyer as a prerequisite to validating a disclaimer, the New Jersey
118. See note 88 supra.
319. See text accompanying notes 29-31 and 88 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
121. 499 F.2d at 148-49.
122. See note 115 supra.
123. See note 18 supra.
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courts are concerned with the ability of the buyer to protect him-
self by obtaining a contractual warranty. The court in Moreira
apparently concluded that if the buyer could show that no seller
offered a warranty for the product, the products liability dis-
claimer would be invalid.124 In effect, then, a disclaimer of prod-
ucts liability is limited to those buyers who the courts believe
do not need the protection of the doctrine.
The New Jersey approach thus expands the category of
potentially exempted buyers to include small businesses and,
under the proper circumstances, perhaps even consumers. That
the New Jersey courts permit recovery in products liability for
purely economic losses may explain the greater impetus to
allow sellers to limit their liability. The result, however, of a
complete extension of disclaimability would be the merger of
products liability law into warranty law, at least between parties
in privity.125 And unless disclaimers are held to be per se uncon-
scionable as to noncommercial consumers, many of the original
problems products liability was meant to prevent might be resur-
rected.
IV. CONCLUSION
If courts refuse to recognize disclaimers of products liability
under all circumstances, sellers must always bear the cost of
remedying personal and property damage caused by their defec-
tive products. Absent the possibility of limiting the liability of
the seller, commercial buyers and sellers are denied the oppor-
tunity to create a contractual arrangement suitable to their
specific needs. In situations where buyers are capable of judg-
ing the risk and can themselves spread the risk of loss, an iron-
clad rule of seller liability is unnecessary. The courts that
adhere to the two major approaches to products liability have
essentially recognized that the consumer-oriented doctrine of
products liability is not uniformly suited to commercial trans-
actions. Whatever may be the precise concept that eventually
prevails, it seems clear that it will not be section 402A.
124. See text accompanying 94 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
19761 1085
